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Abstract
Recently a number of countries have experienced a prolonged slowdown in aggregate economic activity
accompanied by a signi￿cant deterioration of the banks￿net worth. This paper studies the optimal bank
behavior when they are severely undercapitalized but continue to operate due to lax government policies.
In particular, we show that when the government policies generate uncertainties regarding (i) the exact
timing at which the government intervention will occur, and (ii) the fraction of the banks that will be
forced to shut down, then banks change their lending behavior. These changes are largely responsible for
the prolonged recession, which occurs in the aftermath of the banking crisis. The mechanism through
which this e⁄ect occurs is as follows. In the model economy, ￿rms need ￿ time to build￿in order to achieve
the maximum return on investment they undertake. Due to the uncertainty regarding the probability
of survival, the banks￿discount rate increases dramatically. This implies that the banks do not wish
to ￿nance long-term investment, forcing ￿rms to switch to the short-term projects. These projects do
not require ￿ time to build￿ , but are less productive. As the quality of investment falls, the total factor
productivity (TFP) falls, contributing to the fall in aggregate output. Such a joint decline in the TFP and





Recently number of countries have experienced prolonged slowdown in aggregate economic activity accom-
panied by a signi￿cant deterioration of the net worth of a major part of the banking industry. In most cases,
it has been argued that the recession is caused by the meltdown of the ￿nancial sector. Among others, the
most striking example is Japan in 1992-2003 (Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of Japan￿ s economy in the
1990s). Typically, the deterioration of the banks￿net worth has been caused by the problem of the so called
￿ bad loans￿(non-performing loans). These are loans extended to entities which are de-facto in bankruptcy,
loans which have been renegotiated, or loans which are past due. For example, in Japan￿ s case, the amount
of these loans is estimated to be anywhere between 24-47% of GDP.1 The recovery rate on these loans is
about 12% of the original amount.2
A hypothesis commonly proposed in Japan￿ s case is that the slowdown is due to an ine¢ cient allocation of
resources. For example, Hubbard (2002) states that ￿the real problem is that capital is not being allocated
to its most productive uses￿ , while Kashyap (2002a), (2002b) argues that the slowdown partly re￿ ects
the presence of a large number of ine¢ cient and unpro￿table ￿rms, so called ￿zombies￿ , which ￿distort
competition. Other ￿rms that could enter an industry or gain market share are held back￿ (Kashyap (2002b),
p.54). The basic idea is that the banks are unwilling to disclose bad loans. Consequently they support non
performing zombie ￿rms by o⁄ering low cost loans.3 Because of this, zombie ￿rms continue to operate, yet
the question why new e¢ cient ￿rms (or investment) does not eventually crowd out zombie ￿rms remains
open.
Finally, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) claim that Japan￿ s stagnation is a consequence of an exogenous
decline in the growth rate of total factor productivity.4 They note that the growth rate of total factor
productivity has declined, and that this decline has been large enough to explain a signi￿cant part of the
slowdown. This argument highlights the importance of ￿nding the cause of the fall in the growth rate of
total factor productivity.
In this paper we argue that the crisis in the banking sector and the type of policies pursued by Japan￿ s
regulators can generate substantial fall in the total factor productivity. In particular we show that the non-
performing loans problem along with lax and uncertain government policies induce a shift in the lending
pattern of the banks, which is ultimately responsible for the fall in the total factor productivity, and therefore,
for the fall in output as well.
1For recent account of non-performing loans see Kashayap (2002a).
2See Barseghyan (2002).
3See, for example, Kashyap (2002a), (2002b). Bergoeing at al. (2002) have a related discussion in the context of Mexico and
Chile. Chu (2002) shows that a similar argument applies when there are barriers to exit rising from government￿ s policies.
4According to their calculations in Japan during the 1990s 1% fall in growth rate of output was accompanied by 1% fall in
the growth rate of output.
2We start with a premise that banks have a monopolistic power in the loan markets and can choose to
￿nance investment projects which di⁄er both by their duration and pro￿tability. Projects in this economy
have the following key property. In order for a project to have the maximum net present value, it requires
a speci￿c "time to build". That is, a particular number of periods has to pass after the initial investment
takes place before the project becomes operational.
Next, we focus on the changes in the optimal bank behavior after the occurrence of the non performing
loans and how these changes a⁄ect overall macroeconomic performance. In particular, we focus on the case
where the banks are severely undercapitalized, but can continue to operate due to lax government policies.
The key assumptions regarding the policy implemented by the government are as follows:
￿ The exact timing at which the government will restructure the banking sector and restore the capital
adequacy requirement is uncertain.
￿ The probability of a bank being shut down by the government increases with its level of under capi-
talization.5
We show that this set of policies e⁄ectively increases the banks￿discount rate. That is, the banks shift
to the ￿nancing of only short term projects. The reason for this shift is that the banks recognize that they
may not be operating long enough to bene￿t from longer-term projects.6 They rather ￿nance projects which
pay immediately and use the proceeds to improve their balance sheets. The balance sheet￿ s improvement
e⁄ectively decreases the probability of the bank being shut down by the government, and therefore increases
the value of the bank.
We interpret projects ￿nanced by the banks as actual ￿rms. While these ￿rms, as in most of standard
models, need capital and labor in order to produce, their productivity (TFP) is determined by the quality of
the project. In this paper, we associate quality with the actual time to build of the project. That is, higher
quality projects require a longer time to build. With this structure of production in place, the shift towards
short term projects induced by the government policy leads to a decline in the economy wide total factor
productivity. The latter decline contributes signi￿cantly to the fall in the growth rate of the economy.7
Most of alternative research, as for example Kashyap (2002a) and Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2003),
emphasizes moral hazard as the main mechanism through which the large amounts of non-performing loans
5These types of polices are a characteristic feature in most of the economies in the aftermath of the banking sector crisis.
This has been the case so far, for example, in Japan.
6It is implicit in our analysis that longer term projects are more pro￿table than short term ones. However, the liquidation
value of the long-term projects for the banks is very low.
7In a recent work Barseghyan (2002) highlights a di⁄erent mechanism through which the problem of non-performing loans
reduces aggregate economic activity. In that model the delay in the government intervention results in averting resources away
from investment.
3held by the banks a⁄ect the economy.8 As it was mentioned above, the moral hazard mechanisms cannot
explain why the new productive investment does not take place. In contrast, in our model there is a shift
in the type of new investment: from productive to (relatively) unproductive. Thus, overall, total factor
productivity is on decline, drugging down the growth of output.
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2 we present the model economy. In Section 3
we describe the dynamics of the economy after a bad loan shock. Section 4 provides conclusions and details
some of the future work on this project.
2 The Model Economy
We consider a small open AK economy populated by the households, ￿rms, banks, and the government.
2.1 Households
Households in this economy are in￿nitely lived agents who maximize their expected life time utility. Their






ct + St+1 = RtSt;
where ct is period￿ s t consumption, St+1 is period￿ s, t savings and Rt is the interest rate. We assume that the
households have a perfect access to the world capital markets. The households can save through domestic
banks and through world capital markets. Because depositors are protected by full deposit insurance, the
interest rate domestic banks pay is equal to the world interest rate. For this reason, households are indi⁄erent
between allocating their savings at home or abroad.9 We assume that the world interest rate is constant and
equal to the inverse of the discount rate ￿ : RD = 1=￿:
2.2 Firms
In order to operate the ￿rms need to rent a production location from the bank. Once a location is rented
the ￿rm can produce according to the following technology:
yi = AiK
where yi is the ￿rm￿ s output, and Ai;i = fL;Hg is the productivity parameter which depends on the type
of location the ￿rm has rented. Regardless of the project￿ s type, in order to be able to produce, ￿rms need
8See for example,
9Note, that the households do not directly own domestic banks. As we will show later, this is without loss of generality.
4to pay a one period ahead installation cost of P(K) for K units of capital they install. Consequently, the
maximization problem of the ￿rm is given by
￿i
t = AiKt ￿ (RD ￿ 1)Kt ￿ RDP(Kt) ￿ Ri
where R is the world interest rate, and Ri is the rent paid to the bank
The ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rm are given by
[Ai ￿ r] = RDP0(Kt):
where r = RD ￿ 1: We assume that
P0(Kt) > 0;
P00(Kt) > 0:
This implies that the optimal amount of capital installed for H projects is higher than the amount installed
for L projects.
2.3 Banks
There is a continuum of measure one banks, which are in￿nitely lived. We assume that the banks are owned
by net present value maximizing foreign ￿nancial intermediaries. Banks are competitive in the deposit
market, but enjoy a monopoly power in the loan market at the locations they operate.10
Each period the banks perform the following actions:
￿ Collect new deposits;
￿ Collect payments on loans made in the previous period;
￿ Receive a capital injection from the shareholders (if any);
￿ Pay dividends;
￿ Receive government transfers (if any);
￿ Pay o⁄ previous period depositors;
￿ Make loans to entrepreneurs.
10We assume that there exist a high enough entry cost to the banking industry, so that their monopoly power is uncontested.
5The banks￿loan portfolio consists of two types of loans. Type H loans11 made in period t mature in
period t+2 and pay a return RH
t+2. Type L loans made in period t mature in period t+1 and pay a return
RL
t+1:











t ) + Tt
where
LS
t one period loans made in period t
LH
t two period loans made in period t
Dt deposits in the period t
E￿
t equity injection in the period t
divt dividends paid in the period t
RD interest on deposits paid in period t
RS
t interest on one period loans paid in period t
RH
t interest on two period loans paid in period t
C(L) is the cost of making L loans 12
Tt is the government transfer in period t







where q is a constant chosen by the government.13





That, is the worth of the bank NWt is the di⁄erence between its assets and liabilities. Also, the pro￿ts of





t￿1 ￿ RDDt￿1 ￿ C(LS
t + LH
t ):
11To ease the notational burden we indentify the number of locations of a particular type: H or S , as the amount of loans of
that type the banks have. The cost of creating one unit of these loans (i.e. locations) is 1, the return from this asset is Ri
t+j;
i = H;S; j = 2 if i = H; and j = 1 if i = S:
12We assume that there is no di⁄erence in the cost of making a short-term and long-term loans.
13Note, that the type H loans which have been made one period earlier are counted towards assets at a cost, that is the
deposit rate rate RD
t￿1:
6We assume that prior to the bad loan shock to be described later the banks do not face any uncertainty.
Further, let AH and AS be such that
RH
RD > RS:
This implies that the banks ￿nance solely the projects of type H; since the latter have higher net present
value. Further, the optimal amounts of loans are given by:
LH




Note this is a steady state value of loans. Because there is no uncertainty the banks are indi⁄erent between
￿nancing their operation through equity or debt. We assume that prior to the bad loan shock the banks











2.4 The Steady State of the Economy
Given the steady state of the banks, we can describe the economy￿ s steady state. LH
ss locations are operating







Thus, net output in steady state is given by
Yss = LH
ss (Kss ￿ P(Kss))
Since the households face a constant interest rate, their consumption decision is completely determined by
the world interest rate and initial level of savings S0: For example, with logarithmic utility function their





We assume that Sss is such that the net foreign foreign asset position of the country is zero.
2.5 The Banks after the Bad Loan Shock
Initially, the economy is at its steady state. At time zero a shock occurs which lowers the gross amount
collected on previously made loans by ￿X.
7The government￿ s response to this shock is to relax capital adequacy requirement.14 In particular the







Without loss of generality we assume that the banks are not allowed to pay dividends while taking advantage
of the new capital adequacy requirement.
Denote by V B







That is a bank can salvage any assets remaining after the depositors are fully repaid.
We assume that the timing of the government￿ s intervention is uncertain. Once the intervention takes
place each bank faces a probability of being shut down which increases with its level of under capitalization.
Let ￿t+1 denote the probability that a bank will be shut down at period (t + 1). Similarly, let indt = f0;1g
indicate whether the government has intervened or not. Then it follows that the bank￿ s maximization




























< q; then divt = 0 (2.3)
where !t+1 = (^ !t+1;!
g
t+1); is the state of the economy








The government￿ s actions are considered to be exogenous. We assume that probability of being shut down






14The rationale for this assumption is as follows. We think the government cannot completely abandon the capital adequacy
requirement due to standard moral hazard considerations. Yet, maintaining the capital adequacy requirement on the original
level is not feasible because no bank can meet such a requirement after the bad loan shock. Thus, the only way the government




t+1 is the probability that the intervention occurs and ￿
B
t+1(^ !t+1) is the probability of an individual
bank with a state ^ !t+1 The transfer amount Tt to the banks which will not be shut down is ￿nanced through
lump sum taxes ￿t:
(1 ￿ ￿t+1(!t+1))Tt = ￿t:
2.7 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is de￿ned as sequences of prices (RS
t ;RH











￿ the government policy is feasible: ￿t ￿ St for all t;
and given the government policy:






t ) solve the banks￿problem in each period;
￿ (KS
t+1;KH
t+1) solve the ￿rms￿problem in each period;
￿ markets clear in each period.
3 The Dynamics of the Economy after a Bad Loan Shock
The main ￿nding of the paper evolve around the question: ￿ What happens after the bad loan shock under
the following government policies?
￿ The probability of the government￿ s intervention ￿t+1 is positive in every period.
￿ The probability of being shut down faced by an individual bank ￿
B
t+1(^ !t+1) depends only on the degree
of capitalization of the bank:
￿
B








t+1(￿) is increasing and concave.




t+1 and the level of the bad loan shock X the banks￿
optimal behavior is as follows:
￿ There is no capital injection E￿
t+1;
￿ The banks ￿nance only short term projects.




























< q; then divt = 0
The ￿rst order conditions for the problem above can be written as:
LS
t : ￿At [1 + C0

















t : ￿At [1 + C0


























t : ￿1 + At ￿ 0 (3.4)
where At and Bt denote the Lagrange multipliers for the resource constraint and the capital adequacy ratio
at time t respectively. 15
From the ￿rst order conditions for the banks￿problem one can see that E￿
t = 0 as long as
At < 1
The last condition simply implies that the increase in the net present value of the bank from a capital
injection is lower then the current dollar value of the capital injection itself. Yet, one can also see from (3.1)-
(3.4) that the banks ￿nance only short term projects as long as (3.1) holds with equality and condition (3.2)
is satis￿ed as an inequality.
The reason for such a shift is as follows. Despite the fact the bank￿ s chances for survival do not warrant
capital injection, the bank￿ s survival probability rises as the degree of under capitalization falls. Therefore,
the banks have an incentive to ￿ gamble￿for resurrection by improving their next period capitalization ratio
by as much as it is possible without injecting any capital of their own. For this phenomenon to occur it is
crucial that the loans which are outstanding count towards assets only at a cost for making such loans. This
assumption, which is commonly used in the banking literature argument16, is justi￿ed as follows: the bank￿ s
15As a technical note let us note that the value of the bank after it has been recapitalized, is given by
VT = RS
TLS






where Vss is the value of the bank at the steady state. This allows for the FOC of the bank to be computed explicitly.
16See for example Devatripont and Tirole (1993), or Freixas and Rochet (1997).
10monitoring cannot be replicated by any other agent in the economy. Therefore, the market value of the loan
is lower then its value for the bank.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of various aggregate variables for the scenario above. Right after the
bad loan shock the banks stop ￿nancing long-term loans and shift completely to short-term ones. Moreover,
the total amount of loans falls. The reason for latter e⁄ects is the severe under capitalization of the banks.
Absent capital adequacy requirement, the banks would immediately increase the amount of deposits to make
more loans. Yet, even with the new relaxed capital adequacy requirement their capital has deteriorated so
much that total amount of loans they can a⁄ord to extend goes down.
The fall in loans continues despite the slow rise in the amount of deposits. These seemingly controversial
result is due to the new capital adequacy requirement: the amount of the losses counted towards the assets




to rise despite the fall in Lt:
Output falls due to two reasons. First, the overall number of ￿rms that are operating is on decline
because of a fall in the total amount of loans. Second, the total factor productivity of the ￿rms falls by the
ratio (AH ￿ AS)=AH; because of the shift in the lending pattern of the banks.
4 Conclusions
This paper attempts to identify channels through which the banking crisis a⁄ects the performance of the
economy. In particular, we focus on the e⁄ects of the banking crisis on the lending patterns of the banks.
We show that when undercapitalized banks face uncertain government policies, their e⁄ective discount factor
increases. The latter e⁄ect forces the banks to ￿nance only short term investment, which is not the most
e¢ cient (i.e. the most productive) from the social point of view. In particular, such investment leads to
a lower total factor productivity, thereby contributing to the fall in level and/or the growth rate of total
output.
The policy implications of the paper of the paper reinforce earlier ￿ndings (see Barseghyan (2002),
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2003)): while the paper does not argue in favor or against the existence of
the deposit insurance, it provides a rationale for an immediate government￿ s intervention and restructuring
of the banking sector.
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Number of Business Establishments (in thousands)  
1981  1986  1991  1996  1999 
6291  6512  6559  6522  6203 
 
Notes 
1)  GDP and Investment Data are from the National Accounts, 93SNA, population numbers are from IMF database. 
2)  TFP is the Solow Residual of Hayashi and Prescott (2002). 
3)  Nikkei 225 Index is publicly available from the Bank of Japan. 
4)  Number of Business Establishments is from Statistical Handbook of Japan, available on line at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index.htm. 
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Figure 2. The Response of the Economy to the Bad Loan Shock







Output Relative to Steady State